Disaster and Recovery - The Effects of Post-Disaster Aid on Economic Development
Underlying Theory and Prior
The loss of industry emanates from
a crowding out issue. Consider an example
Work
where a charity is willing to come to an area to build houses. Likely, there is
someone with the skills and ability to create houses locally; their level of quality
may be lower than the charity’s, but these local builders are capable. The
charities add an issue for local businesses, the charities will do the work for free,
or at a heavily reduced cost. Let’s assume that the local builders were building
houses at a given rate, and then charities arrive and are willing to build houses
free or at a reduced rate. Who are local consumers likely to pick? The cheaper
option more than likely. Thus, the local builders lose out on sales. If this trend
continues, the local builders may be crowded out by the charities. Similarly, a
business may not start up if they believe a charity may simply show up and
undercut them.
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An analysis of various charities, NGOs, and foreign aid and their effects on
economic development in areas affected by them. We observe the changes in
areas before and after natural disaster. By drawing on the comparison’s we can
empirically analyze the Samaritan’s Dilemma put forth by James Buchannan. We
can observe through the data that while charity actions can help in the short term,
they can lead to long term dependencies. By providing necessary services for
free, charities undermine local entrepreneurs and hinder industry and business
creation. Without businesses to sustain a community, people are unemployed and,
hence, cannot purchase goods. Subsequently, charities see this hardship that
people are facing and seek to help them, and so the cycle continues. While we
may assume that charities act with benevolent intent and without corruption, we
can still see this issue arising. There is an optimum point of aid in which
communities can survive hardship just enough to recover and begin sustaining
themselves, but any aid beyond this point removes profits from the markets and
dissuades entry. Thus, the optimum point of aid is the point in which local
individuals can realize the profits and obtain them, without removing the profits.
This problem is exacerbated by the substantial need that is created by natural
disasters. The effects of short-term aid may help revive an economy, but too
much may be detrimental.
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Method
We begin this process by examining four nations that experienced natural
disasters in the 21st century: we have selected Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Myanmar. By utilizing regional data and the disaster as a natural experiment,
we can examine various effects. We first establish the variation in regions
affected relative to unaffected regions, both before and after the disaster. This
allows us to control for national changes that would effect everyone. Secondly,
we examine the changes from before and after the disaster, allowing us to
examine the effects of not only the disaster, but the influx of aid. We pull our aid
data primarily from the UAID.gov and other major charities such as the Red
Cross. The US is a major supplier of foreign aid in the world, and since we are
focusing on changes in aid, we can use the US aid contributions as a signaling
tool to indicate other donors and their changes.
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The theoretical framework for this issue is laid out perfectly by Calmette &
Kilkenny (2002). They illustrate how charities, in times of calamity or disaster,
skew the incentives of the local populace. They outline that even in times of
disaster, despite developing nations needing assistance, the long-term effects of
charity involvement can often do substantial harm to the local economy. Their
research further examines the effects of situations caused by moral hazard,
complete information, and adverse selection. Oftentimes, charity involvement is
necessary, but many issues such as moral hazard or adverse selection make it
difficult to assign aid to the correct country. They conclude that these excess
costs are borne heavily by the neediest of nations. They highlight issues of
exploitation resulting from charity involvement, but also help lay some of the
framework for optimal charity involvement.
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